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ON THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EFFICIENCY IN JOB ASSIGNMENT
AND TURNOVER: THE ROLE OF BREAKUP FEES
ARIJIT MUKHERJEEy AND LUÍS VASCONCELOSz
Abstract. We highlight a novel trade-o¤ with the use of breakup fees in employment
contracts. Under asymmetric learning about workersproductivity, the market takes job
assignments (or promotions) as a signal of quality and bids up the wages of a promoted
worker, leading to ine¢ ciently few promotions (Waldman, 1984). Breakup fees can mitigate
such ine¢ ciencies by shielding the rm from labor-market competition, but they reduce
turnover e¢ ciency when there are rm-specic matching gains. We show that it is optimal
to use breakup fees if and only if the di¤erence between the workers expected productivity
in the pre- and post-promotion jobs is small. Also, the relationship between the optimality
of breakup fees and the importance of rm-specic human capital is more nuanced than
what the extant literature may suggest.
1. Introduction
Firms often incorporate breakup fees into their employment contracts in order to dis-
suade their workers from moving to competing employers. Such breakup fees, also known
as golden handcu¤s,are a contractual obligation for the employee to pay back a part of
his compensation (or to pay a damage fee) to the rm if he leaves to join a rival. For
example, deferred compensation plans such as retirement benets and stock options with
gradual vesting force the employee to forfeit a portion of his compensation if he quits sooner
than later. Another common form of employment contracts with a steep breakup fee is the
contracts with the so-called non-compete clausewhere, for a certain duration of time, the
worker is contractually prohibited from taking up employment with a competitor. Should
the worker decide to move while the clause is still in e¤ect, he may make a buyout o¤er in
order to release himself from any legal obligations.1
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1There is strong empirical evidence that breakup fees are e¤ective in reducing employee turnover. Mehran
and Yermack (1997) nd that stock options can reduce CEO turnover (see also, Jackson and Lazear, 1991,
and Scholes, 1991). Allen et al. (1993) nd similar e¤ects of deferred compensation through pension plans.
Manchester (2009) and Ho¤man and Burks (2013) show the e¤ectiveness of training contractsunder which
an employee must reimburse her cost of training to the rm should she decide to leave. Analyzing the career
patterns of top executives, Garmaise (2011) nds that non-compete clauses also help reduce the turnover
rate.
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In recent years, the use of non-compete clauses has proliferated in a wide range of in-
dustries. A large majority of managerial and technical employees at all levels of the or-
ganizational hierarchy are estimated to have signed contracts that include some form of
non-compete clause (Lobel, 2013, p. 51). It is also interesting to note that contractual re-
strictions on workersmobility are becoming commonplace at a time when the recent growth
in recruiting networks (e.g., sta¢ ng agencies, social media sites such as LinkedIn, etc.) has
made a workers career progress within a rm i.e., his job assignments or promotions more
visible to outsiders.
The current literature on breakup fees (including non-compete clauses) argues for their
e¤ectiveness in protecting proprietary knowledge and in sharpening a rms incentives to
invest in human capital. But it fails to explain the widespread use of such clauses in industries
where such concerns are not relevant (Lobel, 2013). Also, it cannot justify the aforementioned
contemporaneity between the use of such contracts and the increased visibility of workers
career progress. In this article, we present a novel justication for the use of breakup fees that
abstracts away from the issues of investment or knowledge protection and is also consistent
with the simultaneity between the rise in the use of such fees and the increased visibility of
the workerscareer path.
We consider an environment with asymmetric learning on workersproductivity, in which
the outside labor market takes the workers job assignments (or promotions) as a signal
of their productivity. As shown by Waldman (1984), such signaling implications of job
assignments leads to ine¢ ciently fewer promotions. We argue that breakup fees can mitigate
such ine¢ ciencies. However, in the presence of rm-specic matching gains, breakup fees
may also reduce e¢ ciency in worker turnover. We analyze the optimality of breakup fees in
light of this trade-o¤.
We explore this trade-o¤ by using a simple two-period principal-agent model where the
rm (principal) has two types of job, 1 and 2. In period one, the rm hires an agent
with unknown ability and assigns him to job 1. The initial contract species a wage for
period one and a breakup fee payable to the rm should the worker decide to leave for a
competitor in the future. In period two, the rm privately observes the workers ability
and decides whether to promote him to job 2. The workers with higher ability are more
productive in job 2 compared to job 1. Once the promotion decision is made, it is publicly
observed and multiple rms in the outside labor market with whom the worker might be
better matched compete in wages to bid away the worker. The initial employer can make
a countero¤er upon observing external recruitersbids. The rm o¤ers a period-two wage if
it prefers to retain the worker. Otherwise, it lets the worker go and collects the breakup fee.
However, the rm may renegotiate and lower the fee if it prefers to do so.
As workers with higher ability are more likely to be promoted, and a workers promotion
is more visible publicly than his actual ability, job assignment becomes a signal of quality.
However, as just noted, this signaling implication of promotion distorts e¢ ciency in job
assignment (Waldman, 1984). The outside labor market takes promotion as a signal of
high quality of a worker and it may try to bid him away by o¤ering a higher wage. Since
competition bids up the wage of a promoted worker, a rm only promotes a worker if he
would be su¢ ciently more productive in job 2 that he would be worth the higher wage that
comes with a promotion. Consequently, too few workers are promoted compared with what
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would be socially e¢ cient.2 Breakup fees can mitigate such ine¢ ciencies by creating a wedge
between what the market o¤ers to a promoted worker and what the rm must pay to retain
him the worker stays back as long as the markets bid net of the breakup fee is dominated
by his current wage o¤er. Consequently, promotion becomes less expensive (for the rm)
and the rm has a stronger incentive to promote the worker.
But on the other hand, the use of breakup fee reduces the e¢ ciency in turnover: When
a breakup fee is in place, the rm is more likely to retain a worker even when he is better
matched with the external recruiters. As the rm lowers its promotion threshold, promotion
becomes a weaker signal of quality. As a result, the market reduces its bid for the worker and
the rm may nd it more protable to retain him by making a countero¤er. The ine¢ ciency
in turnover is detrimental to the rm (ex-ante) since the rm could extract the matching
gains up-front from the worker.
We show that the optimality of a breakup fee depends on the relative size of the workers
expected productivity in the two jobs inside the rm. It is optimal to specify a breakup fee
if and only if the di¤erence between the workers expected productivity in the two jobs is not
too large. Moreover, when the use of breakup fee is optimal for the rm, it is also socially
optimal (i.e., it increases the aggregate social surplus).
The intuition for this nding is as follows. When the di¤erence between the workers
expected productivity in the two jobs is large, the rm already has a strong incentive to
promote them as they would be much more productive in job 2 than in job 1. Workers who
are ine¢ ciently kept in job 1 are of low ability and thus would have had small productivity
gains had they been assigned to job 2. Thus, in such a setting, the marginal gains from
the more e¢ cient promotion that is brought about by stipulating a breakup fee would be
relatively small. In fact, such a breakup fee would hinder the e¢ cient turnover of the
promoted workers by lowering the external recruiters bid, and the marginal loss due to
ine¢ cient turnover would be relatively large. (We argue later that there is no net change in
ex-ante turnover e¢ ciency for workers who are not promoted.) Consequently, it is optimal
not to stipulate such a fee.
By contrast, when the di¤erence between expected productivity in the two jobs is relatively
small, the rm would promote very few workers only those with su¢ ciently high ability.
In addition, a marginal worker who was denied promotion would have been considerably
more productive if promoted. Thus, the marginal gain from the improved job assignment is
high, while the marginal loss from reduced turnover is low. Therefore, it becomes optimal
to stipulate a breakup fee, since this eases ine¢ ciency in promotion but costs little in terms
of any turnover ine¢ ciency that it creates.
Our ndings on the e¤ects and the optimality of breakup fees have some important implica-
tions. First, we o¤er a novel justication for the use of breakup fees even in situations where
the oft-cited benets of such fees protection of investment or proprietary knowledge are
not relevant. Furthermore, as asymmetric learning about worker quality is a key driver of the
above ndings, they suggest that breakup fees are more likely to be used where information
about workersquality remains private (to the initial employer) but information about job
2Several authors have o¤ered empirical evidence of the signaling role of job assignment and the resulting
distortions as predicted in Waldman (1984). See, for example, DeVaro and Waldman (2012), Bognanno and
Melero (2016), and Cassidy et al. (2016). Dato et al. (2016) also shows similar evidence in experimental
labor markets. See also Baker et. al (1994a, 1994b) and McCue (1996) for empirical evidence that promotion
is often associated with large wage increases.
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assignments becomes public. Indeed, breakup fees need not be used by rms when workers
promotions are not visible to the market or when workersproductivity is perfectly observed
by the market. This observation is consistent with the simultaneous rise in the use of restric-
tive covenants and the visibility of workerscareer progress within rms in the U.S. labor
market, as mentioned earlier.
Second, we highlight how the optimality of breakup fees is linked to the underlying produc-
tion technologies in an organizational hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge, such a link
has not been explored hitherto in the literature. An interesting implication of our result is
that breakup fees are less likely to be used when the nature of the pre- and post-promotion
jobs is signicantly di¤erent. Such a di¤erence is likely to imply a large variation in the
workers productivity as well.
Finally, our ndings also contribute to the debate on the enforcement of employment
contracts that attempt to restrict turnover. For example, in the U.S., courts often refrain
from enforcing a non-compete clause, citing harm from restricted labor mobility (Lobel,
2013; Malsberger, 2004). However, in our setting, the court should always enforce a contract
with breakup fee: If the fee is optimal for the rm, then it is also optimal for social welfare.
We also analyze the role of rm-specic human capital in determining the optimality of
breakup fees. The extant literature suggests that the distortion in job-assignment is smaller
when rm-specic human capital plays a bigger role in the workers productivity (Waldman,
1984, 2013; Ghosh and Waldman, 2010). When rm-specic human capital is important,
the worker is more likely to be a better match with his initial employer. Hence, the outside
labor market is less likely to bid for him, and the rm has a stronger incentive to promote
the worker. In light of this observation one may anticipate that breakup fees are used less
often when rm-specic human capital is more important for production. However, we argue
that the relationship between the two is more nuanced than what the above intuition may
suggest.
In particular, we show that for a given breakup fee (so long as it is not too large), the
above intuition continues to hold: The rm is more likely to promote a worker as rm-
specic human capital becomes more important. But there is a countervailing e¤ect. As
rm-specic human capital becomes more important, the promotion policy that maximizes
the rms expected prot also calls for promoting more workers. Consequently, the rm
stipulates a higher breakup fee ex-ante to ensure a stronger incentive for promoting a worker
ex-post. It is interesting to note, however, that this result may not hold if we assume that
the outside labor market never bids for workers who are not promoted, as they may not be
visible to the market. In such an environment it is indeed the case that the rm is less likely
to use breakup fees when rm-specic human capital becomes more critical. In other words,
the impact of rm-specic human capital on the use of breakup fees critically hinges on the
market visibility of the worker at di¤erent tiers of the organizational hierarchy.
Related literature: The extant literature on breakup fees has studied its impact on various
aspects of the employment relationship. There is a large literature on the role of deferred com-
pensation in human capital investment (Becker, 1964), tenure (Lazear, 1979), and turnover
(Salop and Salop, 1976). More recently, several authors have also shown how a non-compete
clause may be used to protect returns on investment in human capital (Rubin and Shedd,
1981; Posner et. al, 2004; Bishara, 2006), to restrict the di¤usion of proprietary knowl-
edge (Franco and Filson, 2006), to reduce turnover (Kräkel and Sliwka, 2009; Garmaise,
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2011; Mukherjee and Vasconcelos, 2012), and to discourage employee spino¤s (Franco and
Mitchell, 2008; Rauch and Watson, 2015).
By contrast, this article highlights a di¤erent trade-o¤ that arises with the use of breakup
fees: Such fees improve the e¢ ciency in job assignments but they hinder e¢ cient turnover.
The environment in which this trade-o¤occurs has two salient features, both of which are well
documented in the current literature. (i) Asymmetric information among employers leads to
ine¢ cient turnover (Greenwald, 1986; Lazear, 1986; Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Laing, 1994;
also see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, for a survey). (ii) The initial employers (publicly
observable) decisions e.g., promotions, outcome of a rank-order tournament, etc., may
signal the outside labor market regarding a workers quality (Waldman, 1984, 1990; Bern-
hardt and Scoones, 1993; Zábojník and Bernhardt, 2001; Golan, 2005; Mukherjee, 2008;
Ghosh and Waldman, 2010; Koch and Peyrache, 2011).
As discussed earlier, our paper is closely related to Waldman (1984). In a framework
similar to Waldman (1984), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) consider a more general model of
promotion and turnover in the presence of rm-specic matching gains. They assume that
external recruiters can invest to acquire information on the workersquality and argue that
in order to dissuade the external recruiters from doing so (since this increases turnover),
a rm may o¤er a preemptively high wage when promoting a worker. The wage signals a
potentially good match between the worker and the current rm, and it discourages external
recruiters from acquiring information (as they anticipate a lower likelihood of successful bid).
The assumption that the outside market can acquire the exact same information that the
initial employer possesses is crucial for this nding. In our model, such direct information
acquisition is not feasible and the initial employer always enjoys some degree of information
advantage.
Another article that is closely related to ours is Burguet et al. (2002). They study the link
between the level of transparency about workers ability and the use of breakup fees. In their
setting, such fees help the rm to extract matching gains from the recruiters. They argue that
the rm would stipulate a larger breakup fee when a workers ability was public information
as the market bids more aggressively when there is no adverse selection in turnover. This
result is in sharp contrast to our ndings, as in our case no breakup fee is necessary when
the workers ability is public information.
The role of breakup fee in our model is similar in spirit to that of restrictive covenants in
the setup considered by Rauch and Watson (2015). In a model of employee spino¤s in client
service rms, Rauch and Watson show that a restrictive covenant can create a favorable
default option for the rm for future negotiations if the employee threatens to start a spino¤
by stealing the rms clients. But even though the covenant protects the rm from losing
its clients, it could be socially ine¢ cient, as it thwarts the formation of e¢ cient spino¤s. In
our model, the breakup fee also ensures a favorable default option for the rm when there is
turnover. In the process, it also protects the rm from labor-market competition. While such
a fee distorts turnover and perpetuates poor rm-worker match, it does improve e¢ ciency
in job assignment. Moreover, in our setting, if a breakup fee is protable for the rm, then
it is socially optimal as well.
Finally, it is also worth noting that our model is reminiscent of Laing (1994). Laing
argues that asymmetric learning about worker quality may distort a rms layo¤ decisions
when workers are risk-averse. As laid-o¤workers are perceived as inferior,the spot market
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competition creates a wedge between laid-o¤ and retained workerswages, leading to ine¢ -
cient risk-sharing between the rm and the worker, which, in turn, distorts the rms lay-o¤
decisions. However, Laings model abstracts from the job-assignment issue as all workers are
placed in the same job.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model, while Section
3 characterizes the rms equilibrium job assignment policy and worker turnover for a given
breakup fee. In Section 4, we elaborate on the trade-o¤ between ine¢ ciencies in job assign-
ment and turnover. The optimal breakup fee is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
some modeling extensions, including the role of rm-specic human capital. A nal section
draws a conclusion. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a two-period principal-agent model that is described below in terms of its
ve key components: players, technology, contracts and job assignment, external o¤ers and
countero¤er, and payo¤s.
Players. A rm (or principal), F , hires a worker (or agent), A, at the beginning of
period one. The worker works for the rm in the rst period of his life, but in period two
he may leave for a di¤erent employer as two identical rms in the external labor market (or
external recruiters), R1 and R2, bid competitively for him.
Technology. The technology specication of the rm is similar in spirit to that in
Waldman (1984). The rm has two types of jobs: job 1 and job 2. Job 1 is the entry level
job where the worker is assigned in period one. The workers productivity in job 1 is assumed
to be xed at  1 (> 0). However, in job 2 the workers productivity depends on his ability,
or type, a 2 [0; 1]: if assigned to job 2 (with the rm) a worker of ability a produces  2a
(where  2 > 0).
At the beginning of period one, the workers ability (a) is unknown to all players (including
the worker himself), and it is assumed to follow a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. But at the
end of period one, a is observed by the rm (but not by external recruiters or the worker).
The information on a is non-veriable, and hence, the rm cannot credibly disclose it to a
third party.
Job 1 is not available with the external recruiters, but they can employ the worker in job
2.3 The workers productivity with the recruiters depends not only on his ability but also
on a matching factor, m, and is given by  2a (1 +m). The matching factor m is unknown
to all players at the beginning of the game, and it is assumed to be distributed on [ 1; 1]
according to a piece-wise uniform probability density function g(m), where
g(m) =

 if m  0
1   if m > 0
and  2 [1=2; 1). The associated cumulative distribution function is given by G (m). Note
that m  0 an event that occurs with probability  implies that the worker is a better
3The main trade-o¤ that we highlight in the paper continues to hold even if job 1 is available with the
external recruiters, but we maintain this assumption to simplify the exposition. We will revisit this issue,
along with the discussion of related modeling choices, later in Section 6.2.
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match with his initial employer than with external recruiters. The parameter  can be
interpreted as the measure for the importance of rm-specic human capital in job 2. The
more critical is the role of the rm-specic human capital in job 2, the less likely it is that
the worker would be a better match with the recruiters. The value of m is revealed in period
two; we will elaborate on this shortly.
We impose the following restriction on the parameters.
Assumption 1.  1
 2
G

2 1
 2
  1

 :
This assumption implies that the ratio  1= 2 cannot be too large, and it simplies our
subsequent analysis by ruling out certain corner solutions in the rms optimal contracting
problem.
Initial contract and job assignment. We assume that long-term contracts on
wages are not feasible. Also, as the workers ability (a) is neither observable nor veriable to
a third party, the rm cannot commit to a promotion policy that is contingent on a. Hence,
we restrict attention to the following class of contracts: At the beginning of period one,
the rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (w1; d) to the worker where w1 is the period-one
wage and d is a breakup fee that the worker must pay to the rm if he decides to leave
for the external recruiters in period two.4 At the end of period one, after observing a, the
rm decides whether to assign (or promote) the worker to job 2. Both the initial contract
(w1; d) at the beginning of period one and the subsequent job assignment at the end of period
one are publicly observed.
External offers and counteroffer. At the beginning of period two, external
recruiters (R1 and R2) observe the workers job assignment (j 2 f1; 2g) as well as the match-
ing factor m, and make simultaneous wage bids bi (i = 1; 2) for him.5 We will maintain the
convention that bi = 0 when recruiter Ri refrains from bidding.
Observing the bids, the rm makes a countero¤er to the worker, that consists of a period-
two wage wj2 and a (potentially) renegotiated breakup fee dR. Without loss of generality,
we consider two types of countero¤er, depending on whether the rm decides to retain the
worker or to let him go. If the rm decides to retain the worker (who has been assigned to
job j), it leaves the breakup fee unchanged (i.e., dR = d) and o¤ers a period-two wage of w
j
2
such that the worker nds it worthwhile to stay with the rm rather than to join a recruiter
and pay the fee. And if the rm prefers to let the worker leave, it o¤ers wj2 = 0, and it either
leaves the breakup fee unchanged (i.e., dR = d) or renegotiates it down (i.e., dR < d) so that
4Even though we model the payment d as a breakup fee, with a slight modication to our setup, we
can reinterpret this payment as a deferred compensation, and all our ndings would continue to hold. In
particular, we may assume that d is simply a part of the workers period-one wage that is paid at the end of
period two in addition to a non-negative period-two wage, provided that the worker continues to work for
the rm. In other words, a rm commiting to a deferred payment d is contractually obligated to pay the
worker at least d (as total compensation) in period two if he stays with the rm.
5That m is revealed to the recruiters after the rm makes its promotion decision is assumed only for
modeling convenience. For the purpose of our analysis, the key assumption is that m is not known to the
rm when it makes the promotion decision. This is a natural assumption in many environments where
the initial employer may not have complete information on the productivity of his worker (or even on job
vacancies) in a competing rm, and this information is revealed only after the worker generates o¤ers from
the potential recruiters.
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the worker nds it worthwhile to leave for the recruiter after paying dR to the rm rather
than to stay back.
The worker chooses the employer who o¤ers the highest wage net of the (potentially
renegotiated) breakup fee. We assume that if the worker is indi¤erent between staying or
leaving, he stays with the rm.
Payoffs. All players are risk neutral and do not discount the future. Upon successfully
hiring a worker (A) of ability a, the rms (F ) payo¤ in period one is 1 =  1   w1; and in
period two is
2 =
8<:  1   w
1
2 if A is not promoted and retained
 2a  w22 if A is promoted to job 2 and retained
dR if A is hired by an external recruiter
.
Similarly, the workers payo¤ in period one is u1 = w1, and in period two is
u2 =

bi   dR if A joins recruiter i
wj2 if A stays with F in job j
.
Let  := 1 + 2 and U := u1 + u2 be the aggregate payo¤s of the rm and the worker
respectively. Finally, recruiter Ris payo¤ from a worker with ability a is
Ri =

 2a (1 +m)  bi if Ri successfully recruits A
0 otherwise .
We assume that both the worker and the rm have a reservation payo¤ of 0.
Time Line. The following time line summarizes the game described above.
 Period 1.0. F publicly o¤ers a contract (w1; d) to A. If accepted, the game proceeds
but ends otherwise.
 End of Period 1. Period-one output is realized and period-one wage (w1) is paid. F
privately observes As ability (a) and decides on job assignment.
 Period 2.0. R1 and R2 observe job assignment as well as the matching factor m and
simultaneously bid (b1 and b2) for A:
 Period 2.1. After observing the bids, F makes a countero¤er (wj2; dR). If F decides
to retain A, wj2  0 and dR = d, but if F prefers to let A leave, wj2 = 0 and dR  d
(i.e., the breakup fee may be renegotiateddown).
 Period 2.2. A chooses which employment contract to accept; pays dR to F if he leaves
for a recruiter.
 End of Period 2. Period-two output is realized, period-two wage is paid, and the
game ends.
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Strategies and equilibrium concept: The rms strategy, F , has three compo-
nents: (i) at the beginning of period one, choose the initial contract o¤er (w1; d), (ii) at the
end of period one, decide on job assignment j 2 f1, 2g upon observing the workers ability,
and (iii) at the beginning of period two, upon observing the external recruitersbids, decide
on the countero¤er (wj2; dR). The workers strategy, A, has two components: (i) accept
or reject the rms initial contract, and (ii) choose period-two employer given the external
recruiterso¤er and the rms countero¤er. Finally, a recruiters strategy, Ri (for i = 1; 2),
is to choose a wage bid bi given the matching factor and the rms job assignment decision.
We use perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as a solution concept (as dened in Fudenberg
and Tirole, 2000; also see Watson, 2016, for a general denition of PBE that is applicable
to a larger class of games).6 Note that in a PBE, the external recruitersposterior belief in
the continuation game is obtained through Bayes rule even when the rm deviates from its
initial contract o¤er. Thus, an equilibrium strategy prole (and belief) must induce a PBE
in every continuation game following any initial o¤er (w1; d), and the optimal breakup fee
is simply the one that induces the highest PBE payo¤ in the continuation game. In what
follows, we analyze the optimal contracting problem accordingly.
3. Job assignment and turnover
In order to derive the optimal contract for the rm, we rst need to analyze the players
equilibrium behavior in the continuation game following an initial contract (w1; d). In what
follows, we characterize the rms equilibrium job assignment policy and worker turnover for
any arbitrary value of d specied in period one. Notice that the wage in period one, w1, has
no impact on the rms decision to promote the worker or on external recruitersdecisions
in period two. Hence, it is ignored in the analysis below.
3.1. An e¢ ciency benchmark. We begin our analysis by characterizing the promotion
rule that maximizes the aggregate surplus assuming that following the job assignment deci-
sion, turnover is always e¢ cient (i.e., the worker leaves whenever he is a better match with
an external recruiter). The expected surplus generated by a worker with ability a (assuming
e¢ cient turnover) when he is promoted (SP ) and when he is not (SN) are given as:
6Formally, in our framework, a PBE is dened as follows: Given the initial contract (w1; d) and the
subsequent job assignment j 2 f1, 2g, let  (a j (w1; d) ; j) be the posterior belief of the recruiters. A
prole of strategies  =


F ; 

A; 

R1
; R2

along with the recruitersbelief  constitute a PBE if (i) 
is sequentially rational given ; (ii) on-equilibrium path  is obtained through Bayes rule given the prior
belief on ability and the strategies of the players, and (iii) o¤-equilibrium path  satises the following
restriction. If the rm deviates in period one and o¤ers an initial contract (w01; d
0), the posterior belief of the
recruiters  (a j (w01; d0) ; j) must also be obtained through Bayes rule dened as follows: Given an initial
contract (w01; d
0) 2 R2 and the workers type a 2 [0; 1], denote JF : R2  [0; 1] ! f1, 2g as the component
of the rms strategy F that denes the rms job assignment decision. We require
 (a j (w01; d0) ; j) =
Pr
 
j j a; (w01; d0) ; JF

Pr (a)
Pr
 
j j (w01; d0) ; JF
 .
Also, the workers belief on his ability remains una¤ected by the rms initial o¤er. Note that the restriction
on the o¤-equilibrium belief invokes the no signaling what you dont knowand use of Bayes rule whenever
possibleconditions suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). The initial contract (w1; d) does not a¤ect
beliefs on ablility as it is o¤ered before the ability is revealed. Also, in every continuation game following any
initial contract o¤er by the rm, the recruiters update their beliefs using Bayes rule given their (common)
prior belief and the rms job assignment decision (under his strategy JF given the initial contract (w1; d)).
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SP (a) = Em[maxf 2a;  2a(1 +m)g] and SN(a) = Em[maxf 1;  2a(1 +m)g].
Notice that the workers expected productivity with an external recruiter is independent
of his job assignment within the current rm. Thus, in order to obtain the promotion rule
that maximizes aggregate surplus (when turnover is e¢ cient), one only needs to compare the
workers productivity in the two jobs when he stays with the current rm. So, SP (a)  SN(a)
if and only if a 2   1. Thus, the e¢ cient promotion rule is to promote a worker of ability
a if and only if:
(1) a   1
 2
 
=: aE

.
In what follows, the threshold aE serves as a benchmark for evaluating the extent of alloca-
tive ine¢ ciency in equilibrium where the private observability of ability leads to ine¢ ciencies
in turnover as well as in the rms job assignment decisions.
3.2. Equilibrium job assignment and turnover (given d). We now analyze equilibrium
job assignment and turnover and explore how the extent of ine¢ ciency is a¤ected by the
breakup fee.
As the rm cannot commit to a promotion rule, at the end of period 1 the rm promotes a
worker if and only if it is optimal to do so, given the workers ability and the o¤er-countero¤er
game that follows in period 2. As in our benchmark analysis above, the rms promotion
decision in equilibrium continues to follow a cuto¤ rule. The argument is straightforward:
Recall that the workers productivity in job 2 is increasing in his ability (i.e., a 2), but in job
1 it is constant (i.e.,  1). Now, since the workers period-two wage is determined in the spot
market, but the external recruiters cannot observe the workers ability (a), the workers wage
conditional on job assignment is independent of his ability. So the rms payo¤ from o¤ering
promotion is increasing in a while denying promotion yields a constant payo¤. Consequently,
the rm promotes a worker if and only if his ability is greater than a cuto¤ value a (say).
In what follows, we solve for the equilibrium cuto¤ ability level a as a function of the
breakup fee (d). Note that if a cuto¤a constitutes an equilibrium promotion policy, the rm
must be indi¤erent to promoting or not promoting a worker with ability a i.e., the rms
expected payo¤ from the marginal worker must be the same, irrespective of the workers
job assignment. However, the derivation of the rms payo¤ is somewhat involved, as it
depends on external recruitersbids, and these in turn depend on the rms job assignment
and countero¤er decisions. As the equilibrium strategies must be sequentially rational, we
derive these payo¤s through backward induction.
First, consider the rms payo¤ from keeping a worker (including the marginal one) in job
1. We begin our derivation of the rms payo¤ by rst considering its countero¤er decision.
Trivially, if there are no o¤ers from external recruiters (i.e., bi = 0 for all i), the rm o¤ers
a wage w12 = 0 to the worker to match his outside option and retains him in job 1.
7 But if
the worker receives an external o¤er, the rms countero¤er requires a more careful study.
7In our setting, the outside option of the worker in period two is the payo¤ he would get if he left the
rm but did not get hired by any external recruiter. By our modeling assumptions, this payo¤ is zero. That
is, we implicitly assume that the rm cannot contractually require a breakup fee from the worker should
he leave the rm irrespective of his subsequent employment status. This is a natural assumption since, in
practice, any clause in a labor contract that imposes restrictions on the workersmobility, such as a breakup
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Let b denote the highest bid that the worker receives; i.e., b = maxfb1; b2g. (Throughout
this article we refer to b as the market bid.) Notice that upon receiving a market bid b, the
worker (assigned in job 1) leaves the rm if and only if b >  1. When b   1, the rm
retains the worker by o¤ering him (w12; dR) = (0; d) if b  d and (w12; dR) = (b  d; d) if
b > d. Notice that in both cases, the rm leaves the breakup fee unchanged. But if b >  1,
the rm lets the worker go, and it collects min fb; dg from the worker as a breakup fee; if
b < d the rm renegotiates the breakup fee down and o¤ers (w12; dR) = (0; b); and if b  d,
no renegotiation is called for and (w12; dR) = (0; d).
Now, moving backwards in the game, consider the external recruitersbidding strategy
for a worker assigned to job 1 given a promotion threshold a (i.e., where the worker is
promoted only if his ability exceeds a cuto¤ a). Since the external recruiters compete for
the worker, they make zero expected prot (in equilibrium) and bid the expected value of a
worker whom they could successfully recruit (given the rms countero¤er decision). That
is, the external recruiters successfully bid for a worker assigned in job 1 when:
(2) Ea [ 2a(1 +m) j a 2 [0; a)] =
1
2
 2a
(1 +m) >  1 , m >
2 1
a 2
  1:
So, the external recruitersequilibrium wage bids are b1 = b2 = bN where:
(3) bN(m; a
) =
(
0 if m  2 1
a 2
  1
1
2
 2a
(1 +m) if m > 2 1
a 2
  1 .
Note that bN is increasing in both m and a
. A larger m implies a higher productivity,
and hence, leads to a higher bid. A larger a implies that the rm is more selective in its
promotion decision, and hence, the expected ability of the worker who misses promotion
also increases. However, the equilibrium bid does not depend on d as it gets renegotiated
whenever the rm nds it optimal to do so.
Using bN we can derive the rms payo¤ from keeping the marginal worker in job 1. From
the rms countero¤er strategy we know that when bN(m; a
) = 0, the worker stays with the
rm and the rm earns  1; but when b

N(m; a
) > 0, the worker leaves the rm and the rm
earns min fbN(m; a); dg. That is, the rms payo¤ (as a function of m and d given a) is:
(4) N(m; d; a) =

 1 if m  2 1a 2   1
min fbN(m; a); dg otherwise
:
Next, consider the rms payo¤ from promoting the marginal worker to job 2. As before,
a promoted worker who does not receive any market o¤er gets w22 = 0. If the worker receives
a market o¤er of b, the rm makes a countero¤er and retains him if b  a 2 but lets him go
otherwise by (possibly) renegotiating the breakup fee down to dR = min fb; dg.
Observe that external recruiters face a winners curse problem while bidding for a worker
in job 2: A successful bid necessarily implies that the workers ability is relatively low (i.e.,
fee, must be limited in scope in order to be enforced by courts. At the same time, the court cannot force
the worker to continue working for any specic employer.
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a 2 [a; b= 2)) as a worker with higher ability would be retained by the rm.8 Therefore, the
external recruiterspayo¤ from bidding b for a worker assigned in job 2 (when the promotion
cuto¤ is a) is:
Ea [ 2a(1 +m) j a 2 [a; b= 2)] =
8<: 0 if b   2a

1
2
 2(a
 + b= 2)(1 +m) if  2a
 < b <  2
1
2
 2(a
 + 1)(1 +m) if b >  2
:
As discussed earlier, by virtue of competition between the external recruiters, their equi-
librium bids for a worker in job 2 must satisfy b1 = b2 = bP where b

P solves
b = Ea[ 2a(1 +m) j a 2 [a; b= 2)]:
That is,
(5) bP (m; a
) =
8<:
0 if m  0
 2a
 1+m
1 m if 0 < m <
1 a
1+a
1
2
 2(a
 + 1)(1 +m) if m > 1 a

1+a
:
The following remarks are in order. First, similar to bN , b

P is increasing in m and a
;
and it is independent of d (the reasoning is also the same). Second, the equilibrium bidding
strategies (both bN and b

P ) maintain an implicit assumption that the recruiters do not
play weakly dominated strategies.9 Finally, in response to the winners curse problem, the
recruiters shade their bids, and the period-two wage of a promoted worker is depressed.
Moreover, the recruiters refrain from bidding when a competitive bid is sure to fail (i.e.,
they choose bN = 0 if m  (2 1=a 2)  1 and bP = 0 if m  0).10
The rms countero¤er strategy and the recruiters bidding strategies described above
imply that the marginal worker (i.e., the one with ability a) always receives a market o¤er
and leaves the rm when m > 0, but stays with the rm at zero wage when m < 0. Hence
the rms payo¤ from promoting the marginal worker is:
8The winners curse problem with the recruitersbid has also been highlighted in several other models
of job assignment and external o¤ers, e.g., Golan, 2005; DeVaro and Waldman, 2012. In these models, the
worker is always a better match with the initial employer and the winners curse e¤ect ensures that recruiters
only bid for the least productive worker who could be promoted. In contrast, in our setting, the equilibrium
bids could be higher than the productivity of the marginal type (i.e.,  2a
(1 + m)), as we allow for the
worker to be a better match with the recruiter.
9This is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., DeVaro and Waldman, 2012). Otherwise, there
may exist other equilibria whereby the recruiters bid more than the expected value of the worker (to the
recruiters) if the rm is expected with certainty to retain the worker by making a countero¤er. One may
rule out such equilibria as they are not trembling hand perfect: If there is a small probability that the
worker may mistakenly accept the recruitersbid, then the recruiter is strictly better o¤ not placing a bid
that is higher than its valuation for the worker. Such equilibria in dominated strategies also do not survive
the market-Nashrenement of Waldman (1984).
10One may justify this assumption by considering an innitesimal cost of placing a bid. Hence, if a
recruiter is certain that he cannot lure away a worker by bidding the most he can without incurring a loss,
he will prefer not to bid for the worker.
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(6) P (m; d; a) =

 2a
 if m  0
min fbP (m; a); dg otherwise :
If the cuto¤ a constitutes an equilibrium, the rm must have the same (expected) payo¤
from the marginal worker irrespective of his job assignment. So, a solves:
(7) EmN(m; d; a) = EmP (m; d; a):
Observe that even though the recruitersbidding strategy does not depend on the breakup
fee d, the equilibrium promotion rule does. This is because d a¤ects the rms expected
payo¤s from the marginal worker in the two jobs. The following proposition characterizes
the solution to equation (7) and illustrates how the breakup fee a¤ects the equilibrium ability
cuto¤ for promotion.
Proposition 1. Given a breakup fee d, there exists a unique cuto¤ level a (d) such that
the rm promotes a worker if and only if his ability a  a (d). The cuto¤ a(d) is strictly
decreasing in d for d < d^ and independent of d for d  d^ where d^ 2 ( 2;  1 + 2). Moreover,
a(0) > aE (=  1= 2) and a
( 1) = a
E.
A key implication of Proposition 1 is that the larger is the associated breakup fee, the
more likely the rm is to promote a worker; i.e., the promotion cuto¤ a (weakly) decreases
in d.
6
-
d
a
0
1
 1= 2
a(d)
 1  2 d^  1 +  2
s s s s
s
s
s
Figure 1. The equilibrium cut-o¤ for promotion as a
function of the break-up fee (d).
To see the intuition, notice that the breakup fee a¤ects the surplus the rm can extract
from the marginal worker in case there is turnover. In particular, regardless of the rms job
assignment decision, the rms payo¤(i.e., both P and N) is d when the market recruits the
worker by making a relatively large bid. Hence, an increase in d increases the rms expected
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payo¤ from the marginal worker irrespective of his job assignment (i.e., both EmN(m; d; a)
and EmP (m; d; a) increase with d).
However, due to the signaling role of promotion, the market bids more often and more
aggressively for a worker who is promoted than for a worker who is not. Hence, the marginal
workers value to the rm increases more with the breakup fee when he is promoted to job
2 than when he is kept in job 1 i.e., EmP increases more than EmN as d increases. In
other words, a breakup fee protects the rm from labor-market competition irrespective of its
job assignment decision, but this protection is more valuable when the worker is promoted,
since a promoted worker is deemed to be of higher ability and receives higher wage o¤ers.
Consequently, the larger is the breakup fee, the stronger the rms incentive to promote a
worker.
But d a¤ects the rms payo¤ (from the marginal worker) only when the market bid
exceeds d; otherwise, it gets renegotiated down with certainty. Thus, when d is su¢ ciently
large such that under no scenario can the market bid more than d, it no longer a¤ects the
rms payo¤, and hence its promotion policy a (d) no longer varies with d, either.
Another implication of Proposition 1 is that, in the absence of any breakup fee, job assign-
ment remains ine¢ cient, as too few workers are promoted (a (0) > aE). This ine¢ ciency is
similar to the one discussed in Waldman (1984), and it stems from the signaling role of job
assignment that Waldman highlights. As a promoted worker is more likely to be of higher
ability, the market bids more aggressively for a promoted worker. Hence, it is costlier to
retain a promoted worker vis-à-vis a worker who has not been promoted. As the rms ex-
pected prot from promoting the worker decreases, in equilibrium, a worker is promoted only
if he is signicantly more productive in job 2 than in job 1 so that the resulting productivity
gains can o¤set the wage premium that the rm must o¤er to a promoted worker. But as
discussed above, the rm can mitigate such ine¢ ciencies by stipulating a breakup fee in the
workers contract (a decreases in d), since this serves as a commitment device that allows
the rm to implement a more lenient promotion rule ex-post.
We conclude this section with the following two remarks. First, it can be argued that
in the absence of any rm-specic matching gains (i.e., if m < 0 with certainty), in our
model the possibility of countero¤er can remedy ine¢ ciencies in job assignment, since ex-
ternal recruiters would refrain from bidding due to the winners curse problem discussed
above (Golan, 2005). However, a distortion in job assignment à la Waldman (1984) would
arise whenever the signaling role of promotion leads to a wage premium for the promoted
worker (Waldman and Zax, 2016; also see DeVaro and Waldman, 2012). In our setting, the
possibility that the worker could be a better match with an external recruiter (i.e., m > 0)
gives rise to such a wage premium. Even though the countero¤er dampens the external
recruitersbid by creating a winnerscurse problem, when m > 0 it is still protable for
external recruiters to bid for the worker, and they will bid more aggressively for a promoted
worker, as promotion signies higher ability.
Second, even though the use of a breakup fee may lessen ine¢ ciencies in job assignment
(as a decreases in d), stipulating an arbitrarily large fee need not be optimal, even with
the possibility of renegotiation. A su¢ ciently large breakup fee may lead to ine¢ cient job
assignment by inducing the rm to promote too manyworkers. For example, when d >  1
we have a < aE; i.e., more workers are promoted relative to the case where there are no
information asymmetries (or no external recruiters). More importantly, even if the rm
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chooses a relatively small breakup fee (e.g., d   1), any such fee would accentuate ine¢ -
ciencies in turnover through its inuence on the external recruitersbids. As the following
sections elaborate, the optimal breakup fee trades o¤ these two ine¢ ciencies.
4. The nature of allocative inefficiencies
Before we characterize the optimal breakup fee, it is instructive to discuss the allocative
ine¢ ciencies associated with a given promotion cuto¤, and how these ine¢ ciencies may vary
as the cuto¤ changes.
Consider an arbitrary promotion policy where the rm promotes the worker if and only
if his ability a  a0. Suppose that the cuto¤ a0 > aE, as is the case with the equilibrium
promotion policy in the absence of any breakup fee. Given this promotion policy, there are
four sources of ine¢ ciency in the allocation of the worker. We discuss them using Figure 2
(panel (i)) in which they correspond to the areas labeled as A, B, C and D.
6
?
-
a
m
0 1
s
1 s
 1 s
 1
 2
s
a0
m = a a0
a+a0
m =  1
a 2
  1
2 1
a0 2
  1 s
C
D
A
B
6
?
-
a
m
0
2 1
a1 2
  1 s
s
1
s
1 s
 1 s
 1
 2
s
a0a1
m = a a1
a+a1
B0
D0
A0
C 0 B^
Panel (i) Panel (ii)
Figure 2. The allocative ine¢ ciencies associated with
a given promotion policy.
When m < 0 there is ine¢ ciency in job assignment, as reected by area A. The rm
assigns a worker of ability a 2 aE; a0 to job 1 even though he would be more productive
in job 2. When m > 0, there are ine¢ ciencies in both job assignment and turnover. There
are two situations in which it would be e¢ cient for the worker to leave the rm but he
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ends up staying (areas B and D), and one situation in which it would be e¢ cient for the
worker to stay with the rm but he leaves (area C). More specically, it is e¢ cient for a
worker of ability a >  1= 2 (1 +m) to leave the rm. However, when a < a0, the worker
is not promoted and stays with the rm if m  2 1=a0 2   1 (see equation (3)). Such
misallocations are reected by area B. Similarly, when a  a0, the worker is promoted and
retained whenever  2a  bP ; or, equivalently, m  (a  a0) = (a+ a0) (see equation (5)).
Area D represents such misallocations. On the other hand, it is e¢ cient for a worker to stay
with the rm if his ability a <  1= 2 (1 +m). However, such a worker is recruited by the
external market whenever m > 2 1=a0 2   1. Such misallocations are indicated by area C.
As mentioned earlier, the distortion captured by area D stems from the winners curse
e¤ect. External recruiters shade their bids as a successful bid sends a negative signal about
the workers ability, i.e., the initial employer did not nd the worker productive enough to
warrant a matching wage o¤er. Thus, for small m, the bid bP may be less than the workers
productivity with the rm in job 2 (i.e.,  2a) and the rm would nd it protable to match
the bid, even though the worker would have been more productive with an external recruiter.
Consider now the marginal e¤ects of changing the promotion threshold (a0) on these
ine¢ ciencies. Suppose that the threshold is lowered from a0 to a1 (see panel (ii)). Clearly,
this change leads to a more e¢ cient allocation of a worker with ability a 2 [a1; a0]: rst,
as the e¢ ciency in job assignment would require, such a worker is now promoted to job 2
rather than kept in job 1; second, as turnover e¢ ciency would require, such a worker would
stay with the rm if m < 0 (gains shown by area A0) and leave for an external recruiter if
m > 0 (gains shown by area B0).
But the improved allocation of these types of worker comes at the cost of distorted worker
turnover. First, note that a promoted worker is now more likely to be retained by the rm
even if he is a better match with the recruiters due to an aggravated winners curse problem.
As the promotion threshold is lowered, the expected productivity of a promoted worker
decreases and so does the equilibrium bid. As a result, the rm retains a higher share of
workers. Now a worker of ability a is successfully recruited only if m > (a  a1) = (a+ a1) >
(a  a0) = (a+ a0) (the increased turnover ine¢ ciency is shown by area D0).
Second, turnover is also reduced for the workers who are not promoted. As more workers
are promoted, the expected quality of a worker who is kept in job 1 decreases. Hence, the
worker leaves for an external recruiter only when the matching factor is su¢ ciently high,
i.e., m > 2 1=a1 2   1 > 2 1=a0 2   1: Such reduction in turnover has two opposite
e¤ects on the (expected) aggregate surplus. It reduces the surplus if the worker is of ability
a 2 [ 1= 2 (1 +m) ; a1], as he would have been more productive with an external recruiter
(loss shown by area B^); but it increases surplus otherwise, as such a worker is more productive
with the rm and would have left for an external recruiter if the promotion threshold had
been higher (gain shown by area C 0). However, since the matching factor cuto¤, 2 1=a0 2 1,
is the one for which the worker has the same expected productivity with the rm (in job 1)
and with the external recruiters (see equation (2)), these two e¤ects (associated with areas
B^ and C 0) exactly o¤set each other.
Therefore, the promotion policy that maximizes the (expected) aggregate surplus must
balance the trade-o¤between improved worker-job matching (areas A0 and B0) and worsened
worker-rm matching for promoted workers (area D0). As we discuss below, this is also the
trade-o¤ that drives the rms choice of an optimal breakup fee.
TRADE-OFF WITH BREAKUP FEES 17
5. The optimal breakup fee
As external recruiters make zero prot due to competition, and the rm extracts all the
rents from the worker by su¢ ciently lowering the rst-period wage (w1), the rm appropriates
the entire (expected) surplus that is generated by the coalition of the rm, the worker and
the outside labor market. Consequently, the problem of choosing the optimal breakup fee can
be conceived as the problem of choosing d such that the equilibrium promotion rule a (d)
maximizes the aggregate surplus over the two periods. Thus, the rms optimal contracting
problem boils down to:
max
d
 (d) :=  1 + S (a
 (d)) ;
where S (a0) represents the expected aggregate surplus in period two under an arbitrary
promotion threshold a0, i.e.,
(8)
S (a0) :=  1 Pr [no turnover, no promotion j a0]
+ Ea;m [ 2a j no turnover, promotion, a0] Pr [no turnover, promotion j a0]
+ Ea;m [ 2a (1 +m) j turnover, a0] Pr[turnover j a0]:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal breakup fee.
Proposition 2. There exists a strictly positive cuto¤  
1
(given  and  2) such that the
optimal breakup fee is zero if  1   1 but is strictly positive otherwise. Moreover, for
 1 >  1, (i) the optimal breakup fee is increasing in  1 and (ii) the use of breakup fee in the
optimal contract enhances welfare as it increases the aggregate surplus.
Notice that the rm need not use any breakup fee if the workers ability is public or if
the promotion decision is private. In both cases promotion does not play any signaling role
and hence there is no distortion in job assignments. Thus, a key implication of the above
proposition is that breakup fees are more likely to be observed when the information on
workersability is private (to the initial employer) but information on job assignments is
public.
This prediction of the model is consistent with the recent surge in the use of non-compete
clauses in employment contracts that could be conceived as contracts with steep breakup
fees (Lobel, 2013). One may assume that the recent growth in the number and importance of
recruiting networks (e.g., LinkedIn) has made a workers career progress within a rm clearly
visible to outsiders, while his actual quality is still his employers private information. It is
often argued that non-compete clauses are used to protect a rms investment in human
capital. But such an argument cannot explain Lobels nding that non-compete clauses
have proliferated even in industries where human-capital investment hardly plays a role.
Another salient implication of the above nding is that the optimality of a breakup fee
is driven by the relative productivity of the worker in the two jobs: It is never optimal to
stipulate a breakup fee if the workers productivity in job 1 (i.e.,  1) is too low relative to
his expected productivity in job 2 (as reected by  2). Otherwise, it is always optimal to
specify a breakup fee in the employment contract, and the size of this fee increases as the
di¤erence between the workers expected productivity in the two jobs gets smaller. In other
18 MUKHERJEE AND VASCONCELOS
words, breakup fees are more likely to be used when the production technologies in the pre-
and post-promotion jobs are similar (e.g., they involve similar sets of tasks).11
The intuition behind this nding is as follows. As discussed above, the rms promotion
threshold a (d) is decreasing in d. Also recall that such a reduction in promotion threshold
leads to a trade-o¤between the gains from improved e¢ ciency in job assignment and the loss
from more ine¢ cient turnover for the promoted workers. When  1 is small, the marginal
gain from the former e¤ect is lower than the marginal loss from the latter. To see this, note
that for low  1, the equilibrium promotion rule a
 is also low even in the absence of any
breakup fee: As the worker is hardly productive in job 1, the rm has a strong incentive to
assign him to job 2. As most workers are promoted (when  1 is small), the marginal worker
who remains in job 1 is of relatively low ability and assigning him to job 2 (as e¢ ciency
in job assignment dictates) has only a small impact on his productivity. Thus, while the
introduction of a breakup fee does improve job assignment, its marginal benet is rather
small. In contrast, its marginal cost stemming from ine¢ cient turnover of promoted workers
is still signicant, as most types of worker are assigned to job 2 in the rst place. Hence,
when  1 is small, the marginal benet of a breakup fee (in terms of e¢ cient promotion) is
more than o¤set by its marginal cost (in terms of reduced turnover of the promoted workers),
and it is optimal not to use such a fee in the employment contract.
But when  1 is high, the opposite happens: The marginal benet from e¢ ciency in job
assignment dominates the marginal cost of ine¢ ciency in turnover. When  1 is large, in the
absence of any breakup fee very few types of worker are promoted in equilibrium. Thus,
the marginal worker who misses promotion is of relatively high ability and the gains in
productivity from (e¢ ciently) promoting him are relatively large. In contrast, the loss from
ine¢ ciencies in turnover are small as very few types of worker are promoted in the absence
of any breakup fees. Hence, when  1 is large, the rm can increase its prot by stipulating
a breakup fee that ensures a more e¢ cient promotion policy.
Finally, consider the optimality of breakup fees from the social welfare perspective. Since
the rm extracts the entire surplus generated by the worker, if the inclusion of a breakup fee
is prot-enhancing for the rm, it is also socially optimal it increases the aggregate social
surplus generated by the coalition of the rm, the worker and the outside labor market.
6. Discussion and extensions
In this section, we highlight the implications of rm-specic human capital in our model
and also explore the robustness of our key ndings to a set of alternative modeling assump-
tions.
6.1. Firm-specic human capital. The key role of a breakup fee in our setting is to
shield the rm from the competitive pressure on wages that results when the promotions
are taken as signals of worker quality. In the process, breakup fees improve e¢ ciency in job
assignment, though at the cost of ine¢ ciencies in turnover. But such competitive pressure
on wages is less likely to arise when rm-specic human capital becomes more important
11Unfortunately, empirical ndings on this issue are rather scant as task variations across jobs in the
organizational hierarchies may be di¢ cult to measure. An empirical test of our prediction can potentially
follow the approach suggested in DeVaro et al. (forthcoming). In an analysis of discrimination in labor
markets, they construct a measure of task variability from information on factors such as knowledge required,
supervision received, guidelines, etc., that describe the nature of a given job within the organizational
hierarchy of a given rm.
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in driving worker productivity. Indeed, the canonical models on the signaling role of job
assignment (Waldman, 1984; Ghosh and Waldman, 2010) suggest that ine¢ ciency in job
assignment becomes smaller as rm-specic human capital becomes more important. Thus,
one may conjecture that breakup fees are less likely to be used when rm-specic human
capital is more critical for the production process.
In our model, one may interpret  as a measure of the importance of rm-specic human
capital. Recall that the larger  is, the less likely it is that the worker will be a better match
with an external recruiter. Unfortunately, an analytical derivation of the comparative statics
of the optimal breakup fee (d) with respect to  appears to be algebraically intractable.
Nevertheless, as the following proposition indicates, the impact of rm-specic human capital
is more nuanced than what the above conjecture suggests.
Proposition 3. (i) The promotion cuto¤ a(d) decreases with  when d <  1 and increases
with  otherwise. (ii) The threshold  
1
(i.e., the value of  1 above which it is optimal to
specify a breakup fee) is decreasing in .
This proposition has two important implications. First, promotion incentives increase as
rm-specic human capital becomes more important, provided that the breakup fee is not
too high. When d <  1, the argument behind this nding is exactly the same as the one
discussed above. As the market is less likely to compete for the worker, the upward pressure
on wages following promotion is weaker, and hence, the rm is more likely to promote a
worker.
But when the breakup fee is su¢ ciently large (d >  1), the rm is better o¤ if the marginal
worker (the one with ability a (d)) leaves, regardless of whether he is promoted or not.
(Notice that in this case the breakup fee exceeds the workers productivity in both jobs,
i.e., d >  1 >  2a
 (d) :) In such a scenario, the rm benets from promoting the worker,
as this increases the probability of an external o¤er. However, this benet becomes weaker
as  increases: Since the worker is more likely to be a better match with the rm, external
recruiters are less likely to bid for him. Therefore, the rms incentive for promoting the
worker decreases with .
Second, the aforementioned conjecture about the negative relationship between the use of
breakup fees and the importance of rm-specic human capital need not hold. In our setting,
as rm-specic human capital becomes more important, the rm is more likely to stipulate
a breakup fee. As rm-specic human capital becomes more critical (i.e.,  increases), there
are two opposite e¤ects on the optimal breakup fee.
As discussed earlier, rm-specic human capital dampens the competitive pressure on
wages and incentivizes the rm to promote more workers, i.e., a (0) decreases with .
Clearly, this e¤ect reduces the need for a breakup fee in the optimal contract when the
rm tries to implement a specic promotion cuto¤. But there is a countervailing e¤ect.
When  increases, this lowers the promotion cuto¤ that maximizes the (expected) aggregate
surplus. As the worker is likely to be more productive within the rm, turnover is less likely
to be e¢ cient in the rst place. So, if the promotion threshold is lowered (when  remains
high), the associated marginal loss from an ine¢ cient turnover is small, whereas the mar-
ginal gain from a more e¢ cient job-assignment is large: Since the worker is now more likely
to stay with the rm, assigning him to the right job becomes more important. Thus, even
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though a (0) decreases with , the rm may now want to implement an even lower cuto¤
for promotion, and use a breakup fee to accomplish this.
However, it is important to note that the argument above hinges critically on the fact that
external recruiters can hire a worker even if he is not promoted. The result is overturned
if one assumes that recruiters bid for a worker only if he is promoted while a worker who
remains in job 1 is insulated from the outside labor market.12 In such a setting, the rm is
indeed less likely to use a breakup fee when  increases as the countervailing e¤ect mentioned
above is weaker. The working-paper version of this article (Mukherjee and Vasconcelos, 2015)
presents a complete analysis of this setting.
To sum up, the relationship between the use of breakup fees and the importance of rm-
specic human capital is more subtle than what the extant literature suggests; the market
visibility of workers who remain in lower-level jobs plays a key role in governing this rela-
tionship.
6.2. On the nature of the external labor market. Our model makes two major as-
sumptions about the external labor market. (i) The external recruiters can only o¤er job 2,
whereas the initial employer can o¤er both jobs in both periods. (ii) A competitive external
labor market is available only in period two, while the period-one employer is a monopsonist,
as it is the only rm that can o¤er the entry-level job. While these assumptions simplify the
analysis and exposition, it is important to note that the key economic e¤ects that our model
illustrates do not hinge on either one of them.
It is straightforward to amend the model and allow the external recruiters to o¤er job
1. In fact, our model is identical to a setting in which the workers output in period one
(in job 1) with the initial employer is 0, but in period two, his productivity in job 1 with
the initial employer is  1 whereas with an external recruiter it would remain at 0. In other
words, there is a rm-specic human capital accumulation in job 1 that makes the worker
more productive if he continues with the initial employer. Therefore, even if the external
recruiters can o¤er job 1, it is never worthwhile for them to recruit a worker for this job, and
the subsequent analysis of the optimal breakup fee becomes identical to that in our initial
setup.
One may also consider an alternative setup that closely parallels our initial modeling
specication. Suppose that the external recruiters can o¤er both jobs, and that the workers
productivity in both jobs is a¤ected by rm-specic match factors. In particular, assume
that the worker produces  1 in period one (in job 1) with the initial employer. But in
period two, the external recruiters can hire him either for job 1 or for job 2. In jobs 1 and 2
he produces  1 (1 +m1) and  2a (1 +m2), respectively, where m1 and m2 are (stochastic)
rm-specic matching gains and m1 6= m2. One can show that even in such a setup, the
signaling role of promotion makes promotion expensive and too few workers are promoted,
i.e., in the absence of any breakup fees, job assignment remains ine¢ cient. Moreover, so
long as the breakup fee is not too large (i.e., d <  1), the promotion threshold decreases in
the breakup fee.13 In other words, the key trade-o¤ with breakup fees that we highlight in
our model persists.
12Such an environment is reminiscent of Milgrom and Oster (1987). In our setting, one can justify such
behavior by the the recruiters by assuming that if a worker with su¢ ciently low ability is placed in job 2,
he may cause signicant damage to the rms value. As the external recruiters never observe the workers
ability, in equilibrium, they never bid for a worker who has been retained in job 1.
13We omit the formal derivation of this result as it closely parallels our initial analysis.
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If one assumes that the external recruiters can o¤er job 1, it is also natural to assume
that there might be competition for the worker even in period one. How would the optimal
contract change in such a setting? Notice that, as discussed in Section 5, the optimal fee
d is chosen so as to maximize the aggregate surplus generated by the coalition of the rm,
the worker and the outside labor market, and the rm extracts the entire surplus upfront
by lowering the rst-period wage w1. If we assume that there is competition for the worker
in period one, the worker retains all bargaining power in period one. Hence, the optimal
contract would have the same breakup fee d, but the rm would raise the workers period-
one wage w1 so as to transfer the entire surplus to him. In other words, the use of a breakup
fee could be conceived as a competitive response by the rms to the ine¢ ciencies in job
assignment, à la Waldman (1984).
6.3. Renegotiation of breakup fee. Our model allows the rm to renegotiate the breakup
fee (d) down whenever it is protable for the rm to do so. It turns out that our key results
continue to hold even if we assume that the breakup fee is not renegotiable. However, in such
an environment, breakup fees lead to a new e¤ect: Such fees may aggravate ine¢ ciencies in
turnover by directly foreclosing external recruiters from bidding for the worker. A detailed
analysis of this case is available in Mukherjee and Vasconcelos (2015), but it is relatively
straightforward to see why the foreclosure e¤ect may occur. When the breakup fee is not
renegotiable, an external recruiter successfully bids away the worker only if his bid exceeds
the fee. Therefore, when the fee is su¢ ciently large (in particular, if d >  1), the external
recruiter may refrain from bidding even if the worker would be more productive with the
external recruiter.
As this e¤ect occurs only when the fee is su¢ ciently large, it does not a¤ect our ndings
on when such a fee should be used. When d = 0, the e¤ects of raising d on the margin are
still driven by the same trade-o¤ between e¢ ciencies in job-assignment and turnover that
we have discussed earlier. Hence, Proposition 2 remains largely una¤ected: A breakup fee
is optimal only when  1 is su¢ ciently large, and in this case the use of a breakup fee is also
welfare-enhancing. Similarly, the characterization of the equilibrium promotion threshold,
as given in Proposition 1 (i.e., a (d) decreases with d), continues to hold so long as d is not
too large. However, if d is su¢ ciently large, a (d) starts to increase with d. When the fee is
su¢ ciently large and cannot be renegotiated down, it may be more protable for the rm to
let the worker leave than to retain him. So the rm may nd it optimal to be more selective
in its promotion policy: As promotion becomes a stronger signal of ability, it elicits more
aggressive bidding from external recruiters and raises the likelihood of turnover. Of course,
when d becomes even larger, external recruiters are completely foreclosed and the promotion
policy is no longer a¤ected by d.
It is interesting to note that the discussion above is reminiscent of the model of bilateral
trade with potential entrants à la Aghion and Bolton (1987) in which the seller may stipulate
a breakup fee in his contract o¤er to the buyer in order to foreclose a more e¢ cient rm
from entering the market. However, as is the case in our model, such a foreclosure e¤ect
disappears if the buyer and the seller can renegotiate the breakup fee up on entry (Spier and
Whinston, 1995).14
14Spier andWhinston (1995) also note that even with renegotiation, the market foreclosure e¤ect reappears
if the seller needs to make relationship-specic investments and the entrant has some market power. In the
context of our model, this nding suggests that if the initial employer invests in its worker for rm-specic
human capital accumulation and if recruiters can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, then contract renegotiation
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6.4. Breakup fee based on ability. In some settings the rm may determine the breakup
fee after observing the workers ability. That is, the rm may simultaneously decide on the
promotion of the worker and on the breakup fee. How would the optimal contract change
in such a setting? While a complete characterization of the equilibrium appears intractable,
two salient observations can be made. First, in equilibrium, the breakup fee may vary with
ability, and hence the optimal contract also serves as a signal (in addition to the signal
implied by job assignment) of the workers quality.15 Second, the breakup fee may always be
used the workers relative productivity in the two jobs no longer a¤ects the optimality of
breakup fees. The latter observation is somewhat nontrivial and the argument is as follows.
Note that in our baseline model, the issues of allocational e¢ ciencies and surplus extraction
can be decoupled: Surplus extraction is done using the period 1 wage w1 and d is chosen
so as to implement the promotion policy that maximizes the aggregate surplus. When the
di¤erence in a workers productivity between jobs is high, the gain in worker-job allocation
from using d does not compensate the loss in worker-rm allocation, and the rm optimally
sets d = 0. But if d is specied along with the promotion decision at the end of period 1,
the choice of d also a¤ects surplus extraction. So long as there is a chance that a worker
may receive an o¤er from external recruiters, it will be optimal to use a break up fee: With
a breakup fee, it is always cheaper to retain a worker, and the rm receives a compensation
in case the worker leaves. This argument holds even if the di¤erence between the workers
productivity in the two jobs is large. So, in this case, d is used more as a tool to appropriate
surplus than as a tool to achieve allocational e¢ ciency. Of course, even in this case, the
use of d still has the trade-o¤ we highlight earlier: It leads to more e¢ cient promotion but
compromises turnover e¢ ciencies. But this trade-o¤ never precludes the use of breakup fees
in the optimal contract.
6.5. Severance payments and long-term wage contracts. Our analysis assumes that
long-term wage contracts are infeasible and wages in period two are set in the spot mar-
ket. While this is a common assumption in the literature (see, for example, Zabojnik and
Bernhardt, 2001; DeVaro and Waldman, 2012), it is interesting to note the implications of
long-term contracts in our setting. Instead of relying on breakup fees, the rm can use long-
term contracts that commit to severance pay or to period-two wages to alleviate ine¢ ciencies
in job assignment.
Consider the use of severance pay: The rm commits to make a lump-sum payment to the
worker when the employment relationship terminates, irrespective of whether termination
occurs at the end of period one or during period two. Suppose that severance pay can
depend on the job assignment. The rm can always implement the promotion rule that
maximizes aggregate surplus S (a) by choosing the payments appropriately to mitigate the
wage di¤erential between jobs that stems from the job-assignment signal. As in our model,
the optimal promotion rule trades o¤ e¢ ciencies in job-assignment and turnover and, in
equilibrium, both ine¢ ciencies persist. Also, in equilibrium, severance pay is larger in job 1
compared with job 2, as it must generate a stronger incentive for the rm to promote the
worker.
However, such a contract is protable provided that the rm can ex-ante recover the
severance payment by lowering the period-one wage of the worker. As these payments are
need not rule out the possibility of market foreclosure. A complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope
of this article and remains an interesting topic for future research.
15A similar issue is highlighted in Bernhardt and Scoones (1993).
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made to all workers irrespective of their ability and job assignment, this would require the
rm to signicantly lower the workers period-one wage to extract all rents. So, if the worker
has liquidity constraints, such a low period-one wage may not be feasible and the optimal
contract may still fall short of achieving the promotion cuto¤ that maximizes the aggregate
surplus S (a0).16
The implications of the long-term wage contracts are also similar. Waldman (1984) shows
that long-term wage contracts that commit to period-two wages of the worker (along with
the period-one wage) can ensure e¢ cient job-assignment by making the period-two wage
contingent on the job assignment. As one would expect, the same holds in our setting
as well, even though, in equilibrium, job assignment may remain ine¢ cient as it trades
o¤ e¢ ciency in turnover. As in the case of severance payments, such a contract improves
e¢ ciency in job assignment by making it more costly for the rm to keep a worker in job
1: The rm implements the promotion rule that maximizes the aggregate surplus S (a0) by
committing to a period-two wage that is larger when the worker stays in job 1 than when
he is assigned to job 2.
It is important to note, however, that the use of such long-term wage contracts is seldom
observed in practice, as the rm may lack the necessary commitment power. Also, the
key feature of the optimal contract mentioned above i.e., committing a higher wage to
workers who fail to get promoted is rather unrealistic. As promotion tournaments are
often used to provide work incentives, such a wage schedule may undermine the incentive
role of promotions. Also, similarly to the case of severance payments, if the workers are
liquidity constrained, such a contract may not be feasible and the optimal contract may fail
to ensure e¢ cient promotion.
7. Conclusion
Breakup fees are contracting tools that rms frequently use to restrict turnover. Several
authors have argued that such a restriction could be benecial to the rm as it increases
the rms incentives for investment in its workershuman capital, guards against di¤usion of
proprietary knowledge, and protects the rm from potential losses associated with employee
spino¤s. This article highlights a novel trade-o¤ associated with the use of such fees in an
environment with asymmetric learning about workers productivity and rm-specic match-
ing gains. The use of breakup fees reduces ine¢ ciencies in job-assignment that stems from
its signaling value (à la Waldman, 1984), but their use also creates ine¢ ciencies in turnover.
Our key nding is that the optimality of the breakup fee depends on the relative size of the
workers expected productivity across jobs. If there are substantial (expected) productivity
gains from promotion, then it is never optimal to specify any breakup fee in the employment
contract. Moreover, when the use of a breakup fee is optimal for the rm, it is also socially
optimal as it increases the aggregate social welfare. In addition, our analysis suggests a
subtle link between the optimality of breakup fees and the importance of rm-specic human
capital, as it critically depends on the market visibility of workers at di¤erent levels of the
organizational hierarchy.
Notice that any personnel decision of the rm, including but not limited to job assignment,
that releases information on workersquality to the outside labor market makes the rm
16Liquidity constraints can be less binding under contracts with breakup fees as the worker may have lower
rents in period two (hence the period-one wage may not have to be lowered as much to ensure complete rent
extraction).
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vulnerable to raids. This leads to higher wages for retained workers, and the threat of such
competition distorts the rms personnel decisions in the rst place.17 Thus, the benet
of breakup fees that we highlight here is not limited to improving the e¢ ciency in job
assignments, per se. Such fees may be used to mitigate ine¢ ciencies in any personnel decision
that may be distorted due to its signaling role in the outside labor market.
There are several other economic e¤ects that are interesting and relevant in our envi-
ronment, though they are beyond the scope of our model. One may assume that to be
productive in the post-promotionjob, it is necessary for the worker (and/or the rm) to
invest in human capital. How would the presence of breakup fees a¤ect the incentives for
investment? The answer to this question depends on whether the human capital is gen-
eral or rm-specic and who undertakes the investment.18 It would also be interesting to
consider the case in which the market could screen promoted workers (see Ricart i Costa
(1988) for a related model on managerial job assignment). In such a scenario, the rms
promotion policy continues to play an important role, as it a¤ects the workers information
rent associated with the screening contract that the market may o¤er (and such rents, in
turn, can be extracted by the initial employer). Finally, if there is a moral hazard problem
in the production process, the use of breakup fees may create an additional cost: this mutes
work incentives by dampening external recruitersbids and thereby lowering the prospect of
future wage increments (see Kräkel and Sliwka (2009) for a similar discussion).
The issues raised above o¤er useful directions for future research and may o¤er additional
insights into rms job assignment policies. However, the key trade-o¤ between the job
assignment and turnover that we highlight in this article continues to play a critical role
in all these settings and we expect that our ndings will be informative in analyzing such
complex environments.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. To simplify the exposition, let N(d; a) := EmN(m; d; a) and
P (d; a
) := EmP (m; d; a). Using (3) and (4), we obtain that:
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;
and using (5) and (6), we obtain that
17For example, Loveman and OConnell (1996) o¤er a case study on an IT rm where the rm must decide
whether to send its software programmers to the clientspremises or to require them to work in-house (and
ship out the nal product to the client). The rm experiences a high rate of turnover among the workers
who are sent to the clientssites as the client rms learn more about the quality of the workers and bid away
the better ones. The turnover risk distorts the rms job design policy as it becomes biased towards in-house
projects.
18Golan (2005) addresses these issues in a related environment but does not consider breakup fees or
matching gains with the outside labor market. Also see Bernhardt and Scoones (1998) for a related discussion
on the incentives to invest on human capital.
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The remainder of the proof is given in three steps, each characterizing the equilibrium pro-
motion rule for a given range of values of the breakup fee d.
Step 1: Equilibrium promotion rule when d   1. In this case, N(d; a) =  1 for all
a   1= 2 (since 2 1= 2a   1 > 1 and G (2 1=( 2a)  1) = 1), and N(d; a) decreases
with a for a >  1= 2. Hence, N(d; a
) is non-increasing in a. In contrast, P (d; a)
is increasing in a 2 [0; 1]: clearly, P (d; a) increases with a when d   2a; and when
 2a
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Thus, given d, the equation N(d; a) = P (d; a), which denes a(d), has at most one
solution. To see that it has a solution, and that such solution a(d) 2 [ 1= 2; 1), observe
that N and P are continuous in a,
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where this inequality follows from Assumption 1, the fact that  1 <  2 (which is implied by
Assumption 1), and d   1.
We next show that a(d) decreases with d. Since P increases with a and N decreases
with a, it is su¢ cient to show that @P=@d > @N=@d when a = a(d). Observe that
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This is always positive when a = a(d), since a(d) < 2 1= 2. To see that a
(d) < 2 1= 2,
note that
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and recall that P increases with a while N decreases with a.
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Finally, we obtain a( 1) =  1= 2 as P ( 1; 1= 2) = N( 1; 1= 2) =  1. And a
(0) >
 1= 2 as a
( 1) =  1= 2 and a
(d) decreases in d.
Step 2: Equilibrium promotion rule when  1 < d   2. As before, N(d; a) =  1 for all
a   1= 2. Observe that P (d; a) is continuous and increasing in a, P (d; 0) = 0, and
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where the inequality follows from the fact that (1 + m)=(1   m) > 1 and d >  1. Thus,
given d, the equation N(d; a) = P (d; a) has a unique solution in the interval (0;  1= 2).
We next show it has no solution in [ 1= 2; 1] by showing that @P=@a
 > @N=@a for all
a >  1= 2 when d 2 ( 1;  2]. Regardless of the value of d,
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for all a >  1= 2. Thus, when d 2 ( 1;  2], a(d) is unique and a(d) <  1= 2. Finally,
because (i) N(d; a) =  1 for all a
   1= 2, (ii) P (d; a) is increasing in a and (iii)
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when d >  1and  2a
  d, we obtain that a(d) is decreasing in a(d).
Step 3: Equilibrium promotion rule when d >  2. The analysis of this case follows closely
the analysis in the previous step. Once again, N(d; a) =  1 for all a
   1= 2. Moreover,
P (d; a
) is continuous and increasing in a and P (d; 0) = 0. Now, observe that P is non-
decreasing in d, which jointly with (13) in Step 2 implies that P (d; 1= 2) >  1. Hence,
given d, N(d; a) = P (d; a) has a unique solution in the interval (0;  1= 2). We next
show it has no solution in [ 1= 2; 1]. It su¢ ces to show that @P=@a
 > @N=@a for all
a >  1= 2 when d >  2. Clearly, (14) holds when d >  2 and, therefore, @N=@a
   2
for all a >  1= 2. Next, observe that when d >  2,
@
@a
P (d; a
) =  2G (0) +
R 1 a
1+a
0  2
1 +m
1 mdG(m) +
R 2d
 2(1+a
) 1
1 a
1+a
1
2
 2(1 +m)dG(m)
>  2G (0) =  2.
Thus, for each d >  2, the promotion cut-o¤ a
(d) is unique and satises a(d)  a( 2) <
 1= 2. The remaining question is whether a
(d) decreases with d. When d >  2,
@
@d
P (d; a
) = 1 G

2d
 2(a
 + 1)
  1

.
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Therefore, @P (d; a)=@d > 0 if and only if
2d
 2(a
 + 1)
  1 < 1 or, equivalently, if d <  2(a + 1):
Observe rst that when d =  2 this condition is satised for all a
. Therefore, a(d) decreases
with d, at d =  2. When d =  2 +  1, this condition requires that a
 >  1= 2. Since
( 2 +  1)a
 <  1= 2, we obtain that a
(d) does not change with d when d =  2 +  1.
Hence, the cut-o¤ d^ is dened as d^ =  2(a
(d^) + 1) and d^ 2 ( 2;  2 +  1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is given in the following steps.
Step 1: Characterization of S. Given a promotion cut-o¤ a, the expected total surplus in
period two can be written as
(15)
S(a) =
R a
0
R 2 1
 2a
 1
 1  1dG(m) +
R1
2 1
 2a
 1 2a(1 +m)dG(m)

da+R 1
a
R a a
a+a
 1  2adG(m) +
R1
a a
a+a
 2a(1 +m)dG(m)

da:
It is useful for the analysis that follows to characterize S 0(a) and S 00(a). We do so for all
a < 2 1= 2. Since, a
(d) < 2 1= 2 for all d (see the proof of Proposition 1), only this range
of values of a is relevant. Let h1(a; a) denote the function inside the rst square brackets in
the expression of S(a) and h2(a; a) the function inside the second square brackets. Then,
S 0(a) = h1(a; a) +
R a
0
@h1(a; a
)
@a
da  h2(a; a) +
R 1
a
@h2(a; a
)
@a
da:
The second term of this expression is always zero. Simplifying the other terms we obtain
that
(16)
S 0(a) =
( 1   a 2)G(0) +
R 2 1
 2a
 1
0 [ 1    2a(1 +m)]dG(m) +
R 1
a2 2g
 
a a
a+a
 a2(a a)
(a+a)3 da:
Di¤erentiating this expression, using the fact g is piecewise uniform with support in [ 1; 1]
and simplifying, we obtain that for a   1= 2 (which implies that 2 1=( 2a)  1  1),
(17) S 00(a) =
1
2
 2 (  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  )
@
@a

a  a
(a+ a)3

da;
and for a >  1= 2 (which implies 2 1=( 2a
)  1 < 1),
(18) S 00(a) =
1
2
 2 (1  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  )
@
@a

a  a
(a+ a)3

da:
Both are strictly negative since by assumption  2 [1=2; 1) and in both the second term is
clearly negative. Thus, S is concave in the interval [0; 2 1= 2].
Step 2: Optimality of a breakup fee. Given that S is concave and a(d) is decreasing in
d, setting d > 0 in the contract is optimal (i.e., a breakup fee is optimal) if and only if
S 0(a(0)) < 0. In what follows, we show that S 0(a(0)) < 0 if and only if  1 is su¢ ciently
high.
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We begin by showing that S 0(a(0)) decreases with  1. Observe that  1 a¤ects both S
0
(directly) and a(0). Therefore,
(19)
d
d 1
S 0(a(0)) =
@
@ 1
S 0(a(0)) + S 00(a(0))
@
@ 1
a(0);
Let us analyze each term separately. Di¤erentiating S 0 with respect to  1 and simplifying
(use (16) and focus on the case where a 2 ( 1= 2; 2 1= 2), since a(0) is always in this
interval), we obtain
(20)
@
@ 1
S 0(a) = 2  1.
To obtain @(a(0))=@ 1, we use the condition that denes a
(0). Specically, a(0) is the
value of a that satises N(0; a) = P (0; a). Using (9) and (10) in the proof of Proposition
1, this condition is given by
(21)  1G

2 1
 2a
   1

=  2a
G(0):
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain that
@a
@ 1
=
G

2 1
 2a
   1

+ g

2 1
 2a
   1

2 1
 2a

g

2 1
 2a
   1

2 21
 2a
2 +  2G(0)
=
a
 1
,
where the second equality follows from using (21) to replaceG (2 1=(a
 2)  1) with a 2G(0)= 1 .
Thus, @a(0)=@ 1 = a
(0)= 1. We can now sign @S
0(a(0))=@ 1. From (19) and the analysis
above, we obtain that:
@
@ 1
S 0(a(0)) =
2  1 +
n
1
2
 2 (1  3) +
R 1
a(0)2a
2 2(1  ) @@a(0)

a a(0)
(a+a(0))3

da
o
a(0)
 1
:
Now, observe that the second term inside curly brackets is negative. Moreover, since a(0) >
 1= 2,
2  1 + 1
2
 2 (1  3)
a (0)
 1
< 0.
Hence, @S 0(a(0))=@ 1 < 0 and, therefore, S
0(a(0)) decreases with  1.
Next, we show that S 0(a(0)) > 0 for su¢ ciently low values of  1 and S
0(a(0)) < 0 for
su¢ ciently high values of  1. From (21), it follows that lim 1!0 a
(0) = 0. From this and
(16), it follows that
lim
 1!0
S 0(a(0)) =
R 1
0
2 2g(1)da = 2 2(1  ) > 0.
Let  ^1 denote the highest value of  1 that satises Assumption 1. Observe that a
(0) ! 1
as  1 !  ^1. From this, the fact  ^1 <  2 and (16), it follows that
lim
 1! ^1
S 0(a(0)) = ( ^1    2)G(0) +
R 2 1
 2
 1
0 [ ^1    2(1 +m)]dG(m) < 0.
Since S 0(a(0)) decreases with  1, lim 1!0 S
0(a(0)) > 0 and lim 1! ^1 S
0(a(0)) < 0, there
exists  
1
such that S 0(a(0)) < 0 (and a breakup fee is optimal) if and only if  1 >  1.
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Step 3: The value of the optimal breakup fee increases with  1 for  1 >  1. Suppose
 1 >  1. Let d
 denote the optimal breakup fee. Also, let a^ := maxx S(x). Since S
is di¤erentiable, concave, S 0(0) > 0, and S 0(a(0)) < 0 (when  1 >  1), we know that
S 0(a^) = 0. Moreover, observe that when  1 >  1, then a^ < a
(0) < 2 1= 2. We consider
separately two cases regarding the value of a^.
Step 3.1: Suppose a^ >  1= 2. The optimal breakup fee d satises a(d) = a^ and
by Proposition 1, d <  1. Hence, d
 satises S 0(a(d)) = 0. This condition is used to
characterize how d changes with  1. In particular, since S is concave and a
(d) is decreasing
in d, then d increases with  1 if S
0(a(d)) decreases with  1. We next show that indeed
S 0(a(d)) decreases with  1. Since  1 a¤ects S
0 directly and a(d) , then
(22)
@
@ 1
S 0(a(d)) =
@
@ 1
S 0(a(d)) + S 00(a(d))
@
@ 1
a(d):
The terms @S
0
@ 1
and S 00 are given by (20) and (18), respectively. We next characterize
@a(d)=@ 1. The cuto¤ a
(d) is dened as the value of a that satises N(0; a) =
P (0; a
). Using (9) and (10) in the proof of Proposition 1 it is easy to obtain that when
d <  1 this condition is given by
(23)  1G

2 1
 2a
   1

+ d

1 G

2 1
 2a
   1

= a 2G(0) + d [1 G(0)] .
By the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain that:
@a(d)
@ 1
=
a
 1

8<:G

2 1
 2a
   1

+ g

2 1
 2a
   1

2 1
 2a
   g

2 1
 2a
   1

2d
 2a

g

2 1
 2a
   1

2 1
 2a
   g

2 1
 2a
   1

2d
 2a
 + a
 2
 1
G(0)
9=; > a 1 ;
where the inequality follows from the fact that the term inside the curly brackets is greater
than one. To see this, note that the only di¤erence between the numerator and the denom-
inator of that expression is the rst term of the former and the last term of the latter, and
that by (23)
G

2 1
 2a
   1

= a
 2
 1
G(0) +
d
 1

G

2 1
 2a
   1

 G(0)

> a
 2
 1
G(0)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 2 1=( 2a
)  1 > 0 since we know that
a(d) < 2 1= 2 (see proof of Proposition 1). Given the above, we can write
(24)
@
@ 1
S 0(a(d)) = 2  1 +
n
1
2
 2 (1  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  ) @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da
o
@a(d)
@ 1
 2  1 +
n
1
2
 2 (1  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  ) @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da
o
a
 1
< 2  1 + 1
2
 2 (1  3)
	
a
 1
< 2  1 + 1
2
 2 (1  3)
	
1
 2
< 0;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that the term inside curly brackets is negative
(since S 00 < 0) and @a(d)=@ 1 > a
= 1while positive , the second from the fact that the
second term inside curly brackets is negative, and the third from the fact that a(d) = a^ >
 1= 2.
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Step 3.2: Suppose a^ <  1= 2. The proof is similar to that of the case when a^ >
 1= 2 analyzed in the previous step. Again, we show that @S
0(a(d))=@ 1 < 0. The
di¤erence relative to that case is that now d >  1, which implies that the terms in (22)
are (quantitatively) di¤erent. Specically, since we are analyzing cases where a <  1= 2
(which implies that 2 1=(a
 2)  1 > 1), we have
@
@ 1
S 0(a(d)) = G(0) +
R 1
0
dG(m) = 1
and S 00 is given by (17). Regarding @a(d)=@ 1, following the same procedure as in the
previous step, we obtain that it is greater than a(d)= 1 while positive. Given this, for all
d >  1,
@
@ 1
S 0(a(d)) = 1 +
n
1
2
 2 (  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  ) @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da
o
@a(d)
@ 1
 1 +
n
1
2
 2 (  3) +
R 1
a2a
2 2(1  ) @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da
o
a
 1
= 1 +
n
1
2
 2 (  3)   2(1  )
R 1
a4a
2 2a a
(a+a)4da
o
a
 1
.
We next show this is negative. We begin by simplifying the second term inside the curly
brackets. Dene, H(a) := (1 )2a2 2(a a)=(a+a)3 and let h(a) = H 0(a). Observe that
  2(1  )
R 1
a4a
2 2a  a
(a+ a)4
da =   1
a
R 1
aah(a)da.
Using the rule of integration by parts (which implies that
R 1
aH(a)da = [aH(a)]
1
a 
R 1
aah(a)da)
and the fact that [aH(a)]1a = 2(1  ) 2(1  a)=(1 + a)3, we obtain
  2(1  )
R 1
a4a
2 2a  a
(a+ a)4
da =
1
a
R 1
aH(a)da 
2(1  ) 2(1  a)
(1 + a)3

.
Now, observe that
R 1
aH(a)da is identical to last term of (16). Thus, from the fact that
S 0(a(d)) = 0, it follows that when a = a(d),R 1
a2 2(1  )a2 @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da =
  1
a
n
1
2
(2 1   3 2a +  2a) + 2(1  ) 2 1 a(1+a)3
o
:
Using this in (24) and simplifying, we obtain that the expression in (24) is strictly negative
if and only if
 2(1  ) 2
1  a
(1 + a)3
< 0,
which is indeed the case.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is given in two steps. In the rst we prove part (i) of
the Proposition and in the second part (ii).
Step 1: The promotion cuto¤ a(d) decreases with  when d <  1 and increases with
 otherwise. The promotion cuto¤ a(d) is the value a such that N(d; a) = P (d; a).
When d <  1, this condition is given by (use (9) and (10) in the proof of Proposition 1)
(25) ( 1   d)

 + (1  )

2 1
 2a
   1

= ( 2a
   d):
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Using the Implicit Function Theorem and using (25) again to simplify the expression ob-
tained, we get
(26)
@a(d)
@
=
a
1   
 1    2a
 1   2 ( 1    2a)  d(1  )
;
which is negative, since the numerator in the second fraction is negative and the denominator
is positive because d <  1 and because by Proposition 1, a
(d) >  1= 2 when d <  1.
Consider now the case where  1 < d <  2. In this case, N(d; a
) = P (d; a) is given by
 1 =  2a
 + (1  )R d  2ad+ 2a0  2a 1 +m1 mdm+ (1  )d

1  d   2a

d+  2a


.
Using the same procedure as above, we obtain that
@
@
a(d) = ( 1    2a) =

 (1  ) 2a +
R d  2a
d+ 2a

0 (1  )2 2a
1 +m
1 mdm

;
Finally, when d >  2, N(d; a
) = P (d; a) is given by
 1 =  2a
 + (1  )R 1 a1+a0  2a 1+m1 mdm
+(1  )R 2d 2(1+a) 11 a
1+a
a+1
2
 2(1 +m)dm+ 2(1  )d

1  d
 2(1+a
)

:
Following again the same procedure as above,
@
@
a(d) =
( 1    2a) =

 (1  ) 2 +
R 1 a
1+a
0 (1  )2 2 1+m1 mdm+
R 2d
(1+a) 2 1
1 a
1+a
1
2
(1  )2 2(1 +m)dm

;
Note that in both cases above, the derivative is positive, since the denominators are positive
and by Proposition 1, a(d) <  1= 2 when d >  1.
Step 2: The threshold  
1
is decreasing in . The threshold  
1
is the value of  1 for which
S 0(a(0)) = 0. Since S 0(a(0)) decreases with  1 (see Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2),
to prove that  
1
is decreasing in , it su¢ ces to show that @S 0(a(0))=@ < 0 when  1 =  1.
Since  a¤ects S 0 directly and a(d) , then
(27)
d
d
S 0(a(0)) =
@
@
S 0(a(0)) + S 00(a(0))
@a(0)
@
;
Next, we characterize each of the components of this expression. From (16) in the proof of
Proposition 2 , we obtain
S 0(a) = ( 1    2a) + (1  )
R 2 1
 2a
 1
0 [ 1    2a(1 +m)]dm(28)
+
R 1
a2(1  ) 2a2
a  a
(a+ a)3
da:
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to  and using condition S 0(a(0)) = 0, we obtain
that when a = a(0),
(29)
@
@
S 0(a) =
 1    2a
1   .
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From (26) in Step 1, we obtain that
(30)
@a(0)
@
=
a(0)
1   
 1    2a(0)
 1   2 ( 1    2a(0))
and is negative.
From (27), (29), (18) in the proof of Proposition 2 and (30), we obtain that:
(31)
@
@
S 0(a(0)) =
 1  2a
1 
h
1 +
n
1
2
 2 (1  3) +
R 1
a2 2(1  )a2 @@a

a a
(a+a)3

da
o
a
 1 2( 1  2a)
i
:
Observe that ( 1   a 2) < 0 since a(0) >  1= 2. Hence, to show that @S 0(a(0))=@, we
only need to show that term inside the square brackets is positive. Since  1 2 ( 1   a 2) >
0 (recall that a(0) >  1= 2), this is equivalent to showing that
(32)  1   2 ( 1    2a) +

1
2
(1  3) 2   (1  ) 2
R 1
a4a
2 2a  a
(a+ a)4
da

a > 0
Using a procedure identical to that used in Step 3.2 of the proof of Proposition 2 (inte-
gration by parts combined with condition S 0(a(0)) = 0), we obtain that
 (1  ) 2
R 1
a4a
2 2a  a
(a+ a)4
da =
1
2a
((2  4) 1   (1  3) 2a) 
2(1  ) 2 (1  a)
a(1 + a)3
:
Using this in (32) and simplifying, we obtain that condition is equivalent to
(33)   (2  1) 1 +  2a  
(1  a) (1  )
(a + 1)3
 2 > 0.
Using again condition S 0(a) = 0 to eliminate the term with  1, we obtain that (??) is
equivalent to
1
2
a +
R 1
a2a
2 a  a
(a+ a)3
da  1  a

(a + 1)3
> 0,
which holds for all a 2 [0; 1] and therefore for a = a(0). Hence the proof.
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